Institutional directors and board compensation: Spanish evidence

Journal ar
BRQ Business Research Quarterly
  • Volumen: 18
  • Número: 3
  • Fecha: 01 julio 2015
  • Páginas: 161-173
  • ISSN: 23409444 23409436
  • Tipo de fuente: Revista
  • DOI: 10.1016/j.brq.2014.07.003
  • Tipo de documento: Artículo
  • Editorial: Elsevier B.V.
© 2013 ACEDE. We address the influence of directors who represent institutional investors in three aspects of board compensation policies: level of compensation, composition, and performance sensitivity. We differentiate pressure-sensitive directors (i.e., with business links) and pressure-resistant directors (i.e., without business links). Our results show that pressure-resistant directors decrease total board compensation and its fixed proportion, whereas they increase the variable proportion of total remuneration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. By contrast, pressure-sensitive directors offer the opposite results. These findings are consistent with the view that institutional investors are not a homogeneous group and that pressure-resistant directors fulfill a more thorough monitoring role.

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